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Abstract
Migration is a human phenomenon impacting various factors of society, politics, and
cultures today that will continue to grow in both domestic and international importance. Despite
this profound significance, there are numerous challenges for migration with little control of the
flow of populations and limited understanding of the changing trends of migration. Historically,
migration has been defined by South-to-North movements, with the main motive being economic
opportunities with the allure of developed countries, but many articles today have found more
South-to-South movements and myriad other factors influencing migratory decisions. By
examining net migration population from 2014 and 2015, in conjunction with Human
Development Index scores (HDI) with its variable breakdown from the year 2014, this paper
attempts to answer the question of what factors cause net migration to increase or decrease.
Specifically, it will be arguing that states with higher HDI value will have a larger net migration
population.
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In 2017 alone, there were 258 million international immigrants, 150.3 migrant workers,
4.8 million international students, 68.5 million displaced individuals, 50 million irregular
immigrants, 18.8 environmentally impacted individuals, and 25.4 million refugees (International
Organization of Migrants, 2019). Of this gigantic population 48.8% were female and 14% were
children (International Organization of Migration 2019). This population also contributed $466
billion of remittances that were sent to middle- and low-income states (International
Organization of Migration, 2019). Human migration is a common narrative facing all of
communities, states, and any other political and social organizations. The universality of this
phenomenon causes myriad problems nationally and internationally.
The arguably most affected factors are government institutions and communities – those
groups of people who are in direct contact and living with migrants – due to the strain of
resources and inability to manage rising levels of migrants. On the positive side, migration can
aid in development in both destination and departure countries, especially with the practice of
“brain circulation” in the framework that international movements are becoming easier with
technology and information. For instance, in destination states targeted migration policies can
help fill labor needs in certain economic areas, gender imbalance, and elevate the states’ overall
development. In the case of departure states, migrants that leave and get a higher education may
return, which can vastly aid their home states.
The struggle of governments is therefore obtaining the benefits of migration, rewards that
usually coincide with positive policies and care towards migrants and migrant communities,
while maintaining their internal structures and stability. This struggle of balance is due to the fact
that institutions are man-made; thus, the things that impact and change the makeup of the
populations impacts these foundations and organizations. This combines with the additional issue
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of understanding and regulating such a phenomenon that is migration. Reactions against
migrants and negative social concepts are factors that dictate pressure on policies regarding
migration, and paired with the fact that migration is such a complicated and extensive issue, it
can be hard to deal with all the facets of it. The shared trait of states is that migration holds
monumental consequences at different levels of humanity, from geopolitical organization and
states’ policies to societal and cultural impacts on the receiving community and migrants
themselves (O’Reilly, 2012). Human migration holds the potential to become a tragedy of the
commons and international collective action problem, and both consequences would be dire for
migrating populations as well as domestic populations.
Presently, there is a major dialogue reflecting upon the growing number and diversifying
drivers in regard to global migration. In the face of globalism and changing patterns of
relocation, economic opportunities, environmental changes, and a developing global system of
governance and policies regarding migration, the study of migration has become a necessity
today and for the future (United Nations Development Programme, 2009). An area of contention
is what factors are truly behind the motives of migrants and the varying roles and significance
that each generally agreed upon driver holds (Sanderson, 2010). In an effort to explore these
factors and shed light upon such a perpetual human experience, academic studies and
governmental research have been created to garner a better understanding of such a permanent,
global, and impactful event that is human migration (O’Reilly, 2012). This paper explores the
drivers of migration while trying to gain an accurate picture of which driver to frame in order to
understand migration flows today.
In an attempt to add to this field and understanding of such a diverse and pertinent
phenomenon, my research strives to determine factors behind net migration at a state level to aid
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states in refining or bettering migration laws, institutions and organizations helping migrants and
both departure and destination state, and current political and social practices in place. This data
largely comes from Democracy Cross-National Data set and United Nations Human
Development Programme: Human Development Reports, and the independent and dependent
variables used will be from United Nations Development Programmes in the year 2014 and
2015. This paper will examine how rising levels of the Human Development Index (HDI) scores
– a indices that seeks to numerically determine the educational, health, and economic well-being
of states – on a scale from zero to one, impact the changing rates of net migration in states in a
positive, negative, or possibly insignificant manner. The following results aim to contribute to
reducing the problems of migration, in reference to the tragedy of the commons and collective
action issues, and potentially aid migrants in regards to improved governmental
policies―domestically and internationally―and better prepared communities.
Review of Literature
A key component to understanding international migration is looking at the rates of
human movement at a state level, whether it be departure or retention rates, and trying to discern
a pattern of such movements. A way to accomplish this is to examine net migration rates. The
proposed definition of net migration by the United Nations Development Programme is, “net
number of migrants, that is, the number of immigrants minus the number of emigrants. It is
expressed as thousands” (United Nations Development Programme 2009). This figure is derived
from state-reported numbers of immigrants and emigrants – those going into the state and those
exiting the state (United Nations Development Programme 2009). Using net migration, it is
easier to gain a more accurate picture of the types of movement (entering, leaving, or staying) in

3

states’ populations while seeing how states’ policies and characteristics may impact rates of
migration positively or negatively.

Levels of Examination in Relation to Migration
A factor to consider is how migration drivers have evolved historically and the levels of
analysis they were studied. Modern migration has been divided into two waves; the first was
between 1840 and 1914 and the second was 1914 to present, the focus of this paper (Goldin,
Cameron, and Meer 2011). Each period has its own characteristics, and both need to be
examined at three levels: micro, meso, and macro (Goldin, Cameron, and Meer 2011). The micro
level can be understood as the individual’s choice, with a weighing of costs versus benefits
(Goldin, Cameron, Meer 2011). Meso focuses on networks, societal acceptance, and governance
policies like the willingness to lower barriers or to help those trying to migrate (Goldin,
Cameron, and Meer 2011; O’Reilly 2012). Lastly, the macro level examines the role of
“demographic, economic, and political conditions that exert “push” and “pull” forces” (Goldin,
Cameron, and Meer 2011: 98).
Of these three levels, micro and macro were the primary influences, and were commonly
regarded as the main drivers in the past due to global movements being both more open and
encouraged by the government and people’s willingness to move, as can be seen in cases of
colonization (Goldin, Cameron, and Meer 2011; O’Reilly 2012). The studying of migration and
its trends tend to stick to these levels with little interplay, but new academics are pushing to tie
all three levels together and show the relationships between each level on the migrant and the
system as a whole, especially when considering the changing situations of states and their
policies and how these relationships impact individuals (O’Reilly 2012). In the case of the
second period of migration, new literature recently has begun to switch to this trend of
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examining migration at all three levels (O’Reilly 2012). The importance of studying migration
by levels is that it sheds light upon how migration is changing over time, and how aspects of
each driver influences migrants (Black, Adger, Arnell, Dercon, et. al. 2011).

Drivers of Migration
Presently, the conversation around migration and the influences driving human
movements with increasing recognized diversity, like the impact of intrastate conflict and
environmental crisis. Generally, migration is being attributed to more specific motives, or
drivers, and more focus is placed upon the individual’s and government’s roles (Black, Adger,
Arnell, Dercon, et. al. 2011). The debate behind the drivers are largely centering around two
distinctions: migratory patterns for a better life versus forced migrations; in layman’s terms,
migration driven by focus on general wellbeing versus physical harm (Black, Adger, Arnell,
Dercon, et. al. 2011). These two groups – choice migration and forced migration – at their most
basic level can be seen as a reaction against the changing drivers, especially in comparing the
relevance of new migration drivers and changing situations in the world.
These changing situations can exemplified by myriad factors. In the case of choice
migration, rising technological improvements in the sphere of information sharing and
transportation are aiding these migrations. As for forced migrations, the turn towards intrastate
conflict, especially since these types of conflict are on the rise and can be as damaging as
interstate conflicts, increasing environmental crises, and technological improvements – those
impacting choice migration as well – are all impacting this migration type. These distinctions
and changes can be added to older migration drivers and even be further broken down along
more traditional lines of examining migration; this dual reality can be helpful in explaining
migration and understanding how it is evolving while in the framework of old drivers, which are
understood fairly well. Commonly, the two groups are developed with attention paid to health,
5

education, and the overture of government involvement and policies versus economic
opportunities (Lutz 1996). Going along with the new examinations, this section will briefly
outline the above-mentioned drivers, and it will seek to find the most encompassing and best way
to determine the main influence on migration today, especially in relation to new drivers.
Economic Input
Universally, one of the most agreed-upon drivers of migration is economic interests,
whether it be people wanting to go to a country with better economic opportunities or people
staying in economically strong areas (Black, Adger, Arnell, Dercon, et. al. 2011; Gorter,
Nijkamp, and Poot 1998). The role of the economy is significant, especially when examining
failing states and structural issues, while also having its own migration driving points (Lutz
1996). As Nayar states, “it is obvious that economics dominates the migration process” and by
following push and pull motives there is “pull for those higher up in the economic hierarchy and
push for those at the bottom” (Nayar 2014: 243). This can be derived from the fact that migration
and the choices that go along with it have positive and substantial impacts on livelihood patterns,
especially in the case of those coming from less economically developed states (Nayar 2014).
The largest benefit is alleviation from poverty with large income gains for those who move to
more economically secure states with better infrastructure and general stability (Nayar 2014;
United Nations Development Programme 2009).
This experience aids the historical economic theories that asserted that migrants came
from Less-Developed-Countries (LDCs) of the Global South and they typically resettled in the
Global North in More-Developed-Countries (MDCs) (Goldin, Cameron, and Meer 2011). It is
classified as South-to-North migration (Sanderson 2010). To clarify, the “North is synonymous
with the industrialized countries where the income, on average, is roughly six times higher than
in the developing countries, the South” (Lutz 1996: 337). The most common motive was
6

attributed to economic opportunities for migrants in their prospective new countries; in the past,
these economic opportunities were largely more one way and permanent, but rising regional
movements and technological improvements are making these migrations more fluid (Lutz
1996). This can be seen in older literature portraying such moves as “chasing the American
Dream” and the hopeful futures desired by the migrants. Usually, they would move to countries
of the Global North because of the economic development found there, and after moving they
would send back remittances to their home countries (Goldin, Cameron, and Meer 2011; Lutz
1996). Much of these migrations were due to labor needs, which proved to be a major factor of
increasing modernization (Castles 2009). The migration of populations, especially in the case of
“brain drain” because of promises of wealth or opportunities in MDCs, would be directed
towards states with higher economically developed labor systems and economic markets (Castles
2009).
While this economic motive of migration is vastly regarded as the main driver and
therefore applicable, “theories that emphasize purely economic factors fail to capture the broader
social framework in which decisions to migrate are taken” (United Nations Development
Programme 2009: 13). Economic theories attempt to explain migration “at an individual (or
micro) level,” which partially explains migrants’ personal goals but lacks the ability to capture
the impact of migration as a whole (O’Reilly 2012). This is especially evident with the more
“modern” versus “historical” roles economics has been playing on migration (Massey 2020).
According to Massey, “international migrants in the late 20th century generally moved
from poor to rich countries in order to increase employment, raise earnings, and diversify sources
of income” and “21st century international migrants increasingly appear to be motivated not by a
desire to access opportunities but by a need to escape pressing threats to wellbeing from a variety
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of sources” (Massey 2020: 13). The “variety of sources” Massey references are “state
disintegration, civil violence, criminal predation, domestic violence, civil warfare, natural
disasters, political upheavals, and economic collapse” (Massey 2020: 13). As can be seen,
economic drivers are becoming less and less the main factor behind migration, and while it is
still an important driver, much of that significance comes from its connection to other motives
behind migration.
Health Drivers
Beginning with health, a rising importance is being placed upon physical insecurities
with threats to life and the desire to move to relatively more stable states (Engel and Ibáñez
2007). Intrastate conflicts and violence are becoming primary motivators when it comes to
migration, especially in cases of forced and displaced individuals (Engel and Ibáñez 2007;
Adhikari 2012). Intrastate conflicts and violence are also important when considering the decline
of hospital infrastructure, which impacts all sectors of society, as well as issues of general
survival (Adhikari 2012). In states with civil wars, depending on the severity of the violence
there can be an ousting of certain populations, i.e. religious or ethnic groups, that are forced to
leave or face direct threats to their lives (Engel and Ibáñez 2007). This is connected with the
general movement of individuals seeking to find safer and internally structured states (Engel and
Ibáñez 2007). According to Lutz, “persecution exists in many parts of the world, such as Sudan,
Myanmar, former Yugoslavia, and El Salvador. Ethnic tensions lead to murder in war times and
persecution in peace times;” this reflects the threats to survival and lives and helps explain some
migrations (Lutz 1996: 347). The potential for “improved access for work, civil and political
rights, and security and health care” are common factors behind these migrations with survival
and safety being of the utmost concern (United Nations Development Programme 2009: 49).
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These migrants are generally referred to as refugees, asylum seekers, and displaced
persons (Engel and Ibáñez 2007). Refugees are characterized by the forced migration as a result
of conflict, violence, or prosecution with the added elements of race, religion, political stance,
and social status (Engel and Ibáñez 2007.) Asylum seekers are closely related to refugees, but the
main distinction is legal. Asylum seekers are migrants that have not obtained refugee legal
status; obtaining refugee status is a process that begins with an asylum seeker, thus asylum
seekers can become refugees (Engel and Ibáñez 2007). Lastly, displaced persons are similar to
refugees in that they are forced to migrate, but they are pushed out by conflict, environmental,
and epidemics (Engel and Ibáñez 2007). Another difference between displaced persons and
refugees is the legal protections offered to each group; displaced persons do not have as high of a
legal obligation tied to their movements, thus they are offered less protections (Engel and Ibáñez
2007).
In conjunction with migrations concerning survival and safety, those of the intrastate
population that do not get pushed out because of immediate threat to their lives or their
livelihood, oftentimes will eventually migrate due to the failings of the state (Engel and Ibáñez
2007; Adhikari 2012). With intrastate conflict and violence, there generally follows a breakdown
in state infrastructure and the sectors that remain commonly cannot keep up with the population
which puts the general population’s health at risk. A main area impacted by the strain of the
violence is healthcare systems (Adhikari 2012). Migration in these forced situations can be more
permanent than other drivers, especially depending on how long the departed state stays in civil
war and the specific reason migrants choose to leave (Adhikari 2012; Camarena and Hagerdal
2020). In cases where the violence is ethnically motivated and the migrants are fleeing as the
discriminated group, even when the state ceases conflict, has economic and social growth, and is
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relatively much more stable, many of these migrants will not return (Camarena and Hagerdal
2020).
In connection to this, the socioeconomic standing of the migrants plays a crucial role
because typically those who depart more willingly and due to the state’s infrastructural collapse
will be able to return more easily if they desire because of their stronger social and economical
state (Camarena and Hagerdal 2020). These groups depart relative to health concerns of a failing
state, whether it be from physical threats to life through violence or declining healthcare
infrastructure. When a state ceases civil conflict, has better control on violence, or generally
improves the physical security of citizens, these groups commonly can and will return due to the
conclusion of persecutions, discriminations, and ethnic cleansings which makes the departed
state safe again (Camarena and Hagerdal 2020). The nature in which these migrants leave is key
in understanding why and how long they will stay, the best policies for the receiving states to
utilize, and the political and social changes necessary for departed states to achieve to regain
migrants or support those who stayed (Massey 2020).
In addition to intrastate violence in the political and social realms, violence associated
with drug cartels, gangs, and domestic threats is rapidly increasing the number of migrants
seeking refuge (Orozco-Aleman and Gonzalez-Lozano 2018; Massey 2020). In Mexico, drug
violence was linked to 6.4 homicides per 10,000 from 2006 to 2012, while in the U.S. there was
only 0.12 per 10,000 drug related homicides in that same time period (Orozco-Aleman and
Gonzalez-Lozano 2018). Overall, a substantial and growing amount of migration is being driven
by violence, and sometimes the consequential breakdown of states because of it. According to
Massey, “the total number of forced migrants in 2017 rises to 66.5 million, up from 20.7 million
in 2000” with “the number of refugees increased by 64% and that of all forced migrants rose by
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221%” (Massey 2020: 14). Much of this increase has been driven by health concerns, especially
in relation to general survival (Massey 2020).
The idea of “environmental refugees” of “people forced to leave their places of origin by
climate change, severe weather, or the social and economic consequences of these events” is
another growing migration group (Massey 2020: 14). Right now, “the influence of the
environment and environmental change is largely unrepresented in standard theories of
migration,” and is most definitely not fully captured by the standard answer of economic drivers
(Black, Adger, Arnell, Dercon, et al. 2011: 3). A growing number of migrants are having to flee
their homes due to threats to physical survival from environmental disasters, states’ dire
responses or inability to combat and aid populations from and after disasters, and also challenges
to states’ health and social infrastructure due to overall state struggles derived from
environmental problems (Massey 2020).
The environmental drivers are characterized as “availability and reliability of ecosystem
services and exposure” (Black, Adger, Arnell, Dercon, et al. 2011: 3). These relate directly to
environmental pressure on individuals and their survival- as is the case of rising water levels,
desertification, declining soil production, natural disasters, and environmental catastrophes.
(Black, Adger, Arnell, Dercon, et al. 2011; United Nations Development Programme 2009; Lutz
1996). Furthering the impact of environmental crises and its impact on health, the indirect role
these problems have on increasing individuals’ and states’ competition over resources result in
violence, declining access to resources needed for healthy living, and increasing exposure to
harsher environments that impact physical security (Massey 2020; United Nations Development
Programme 2009). Environment also indirectly impacts migration due to how it impacts the
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other major areas dictating migration, like changing economic practices and jobs which also can
potentially hurt personal security (Black, Adger, Arnell, Dercon, et al. 2011).
These negative environmental consequences will only deepen as climate change “is
projected to increase environmental stress in already marginal lands and to raise the frequency of
natural hazards,” which means the present threats to survival will deepen and new threats will
arise (United Nations Development Programme 2009: 45). The role of environmental influence
is a huge one with “some estimates of the numbers of people who will be forced to move as a
result of climate change… ranging from 200 million to 1 billion” (United Nations Development
Programme 2009: 45). It does not help that the majority of environmental catastrophes occur in
developing countries, in which many states are not equipped to handle such stresses and
consequences from such events, especially in healthcare responses and lacking health
infrastructure; since the majority of migrants are from less-developed countries, this will only
increase the amount of migrants (Lutz 1996). Overall, migration due to environmental factors
can be summed up by disruptions of “elemental, biological, slow-onset accidents; developmental
factors; and finally, environmental warfare,” all of which have the potential to cause immediate
or imminent harm physically to individuals and threaten migrants’ lives (International
Organization for Migration 2019).
Educational Evidence
Education is another driver of migration that acts as a cross-section between the general
wellbeing and forced movement (Dustmann and Glitz 2011). In relation to forced migration,
education-driven migration commonly is found in states that are unstable and suffering conflict
(Browne 2017). The importance of education in connection to fragile and conflict-affected states
is heightened when potential migrants have children to consider, and since state conflicts,
depending on the severity, have the potential to break down a state’s educational infrastructure
12

many will move (Browne 2017). The main role education plays in this breakdown is not
necessarily acting as a primary driver, but it is a key determinant of where migrants will choose
to settle (Browne 2017). This ties into concerns of future careers and securities, and in the case
of young children it often relates to family reunification (Browne 2017). There is a search for
better educational institutions, and this pursuit is even more evident at university levels in many
developing states (Browne 2017). Many students will migrate in hopes of attending a better
educational program and thus securing their future, a fact that is supported by the increasing
number of student migrants (Browne 2017; Dustmann and Glitz 2011). This point is important
even in the destination country because it can help indicate patterns of settlement; some
universities have varying access for migrants, especially illegal migrants, so it can help indicate
where specific migrants may choose to go (Nair-Reichert and Cebula 2015).
Beyond this, in countries with low gender equality, there are larger migration
populations of women (Browne 2017). Migration is seen as an opportunity and a way to escape
possible persecution if education is specifically frowned upon for females in certain repressive
states (Dustmann and Glitz 2011). This is also an important indicator for how long a female
refugee will stay in a receiving country because if, upon return to their departed country their
educational opportunities cease, they commonly will not return (Dustmann and Glitz 2011).
Education provides other avenues and protections as well in many developing countries,
like those in South America and Asia, which view it as a way to overcome poverty (Browne
2017). It is a way to achieve security indirectly (Dustmann and Glitz 2011). This view is done on
an individual level with migrants comparing opportunities consequentially from migration to
opportunities spawning from lack of movement (Dustman and Glitz 2011). This comparison
focuses on how migration opportunities would compare if one chose not to migrate with the
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potential economic security due to educational attainment of those who chose to migrate
(Dustmann and Glitz 2011).
This relationship is further exposed when comparing education attainment between those
who chose to migrate and those who do not by looking at the generational effects when
comparing both parties’ children (Ichou 2014). It has been found that migrants who leave and
obtain higher education usually surpass those who chose to stay, and coincidentally their children
follow this trend which leads to an overall higher socioeconomic gain and security for those who
migrate and get more education (Ichou 2014). A reflection of this is that education does play a
substantial role in migrant choices because they will aim to go to states with relatively better
education systems, thus improving education levels (Ichou 2014).
As for the general wellbeing aspects of education, the correlation of movement and
education can be tied a number of ways. A rising phenomenon currently is “brain circulation,”
which consists of migrants traveling abroad for specific educational programs to return and
support their own state and impact its infrastructure (Thomas 2008). This is becoming more
prominent in states that historically have faced problems with “brain drain,” a trend where
migrants would be already skilled and not return to the state (Thomas 2008). “brain circulation”
solves a number of problems for migrants; it allows them to gain necessary skills to promote a
more secure future for themselves, may permit them to avoid dangerous situations in their home
state, as is seen with Ugandans avoiding a violent regime, and builds a positive development
system with human capital that will help their future generations and state (Thomas 2008). The
phenomenon also is a way to track how long a migrant may stay abroad, which is helpful for
receiving states to know and monitor (Thomas 2008). Generally, migrants who leave for
educational attainment but plan on returning seek out education through the university level
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(Thomas 2008). This gives a general idea on how long migrants from certain states may stay
with the regard that most will stay until they complete their university training (Thomas
2008). Incentivizing “brain circulation” migration is that returning immigrants are more likely to
be employed compared to their non-migrant counterparts who hold the same educational level
and training (Thomas 2008). This is theorized to stem from a belief that education from more
developed institutions in more developed states are given more value (Thomas 2008).
A last educational note in relation to general wellbeing promotion is the role of
remittances. Oftentimes these monetary packages come because a parent chooses to migrate in
hopes to provide funding and better lives for their family members (Cox and Ureta 2003). In
instances where these funds were apparent, research has shown that investment in education is a
common expenditure covered (Cox and Ureta 2003). It instills positive opportunities of
development for the non-migrant members in the home country by offering children the ability to
attend school in lieu of working and reenforce education infrastructure (Dustmann and Glitz
2011). It inspires human capital investment in the home country because in cases where
remittances were present there were typically higher literacy rates and school attendances
(Dustmann and Glitz 2011). Remittances increase school retention especially at higher levels of
education and make it more costly to leave school (Cox and Ureta 2003).

The Role of Human Development Index
In light of the necessity to be more inclusive and take further considerations in the drivers
of migration beyond economic development, specifically considering threats to health,
education, and livelihood, the Human Development Index is a more comprehensive explanation
for migration. This index operationalizes examining states’ development and the impact a states’
development has on individuals; it looks at the state level but sheds light upon the individual
level as well (United Nations Development Programme 2009). It provides a numerical
15

distinction of the connection between the wellness of a state and the wellness of the population
living in that state (United Nations Development Programme 2009).
In understanding the Human Development Index (HDI) values, a working definition and
background would be beneficial. HDI is a number composed of three main dimensions: long and
healthy life, knowledge, and a decent standard of living (United Nations Development
Programme 2009). This breaks down into indicators of life expectancy at birth, expected years of
schooling with mean years of schooling, and gross national income (GNI) per capita to create
dimension indices of life expectancy index, education index, and GNI index, which are the
indices that combine to create the HDI score for countries (United Nations Development
Programme 2009). The HDI values can be separated into low, medium, high, and very high
levels, which are the following: low 0-0.499, medium 0.500-0.799, high 0.800-0.899, and very
high 0.900-1 (United Nations Development Programme 2009).
The importance of this in relation to net migration, HDI is a more advanced set of criteria
for determining a state’s development beyond looking at economic development and provides
insight on why some countries may have different HDI values in terms of domestic policies
despite similarities in GNI or life expectancy (United Nations Development Program 2009).
Utilizing HDI scores as a way to explain migration versus examining economic, health, and
educational development individually provides a more encompassing view towards overall state
development (United Nations Development Programme 2009). When employing solely one of
those factors as an explanation for migration patterns there are issues of “false development” and
a state appearing more stable and advanced than it really is (United Nations Development
Programme 2009). For instance, some states may have a strong economy but are lacking
educational and health systems. If a researcher were looking at a state in this situation they
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would determine that the state is “developed” and therefore an appealing state to migrants. The
economic development would be “propping-up” the state’s development which paints a false
idea, but HDI controls for this issue since it accounts for multiple development factors.
HDI allows for the relative nature of HDI scores and states in a region to be comparable.
It can show that migrants may not be looking for the most developed state, but one that is better
than the one that they were leaving. There are also some shortcomings of using HDI in terms of
inequality, corruption, environmental crises, poverty, and human security, but overall it grants a
relatively accurate picture and standard idea on what states’ true levels of development are and
the livelihood populations can expect in that state (United Nations Development Programme
2009). These shortfalls are also covered in HDI because many of these problems will impact a
state’s economic, health, and educational systems, and while HDI does not specifically tackle
these issues, they are incorporated to some degree (United Nations Development Programme
2009). In addition to what it directly measures, it also provides insight to governance because
there is a high correlation between positive government policies and higher HDI scores; it
connects how and why government policies influence healthcare fields, education systems, and
economic practices because states’ governments are the most important actors in these sectors
(Unites Nations Development Programme 2009).
The largest gains can be seen in the lives of migrants who move from low HDI level
states to relatively higher HDI level states. This can be seen in the income differences between
those who stay in low HDI states and those who leave; there was a $13,736 income difference
for those who move to high HDI states from low HDI states (United Nations Development
Programme 2009).In the past, this movement was characterized by South-to-North movement,
but this movement is no longer the most prevalent (Sanderson 2010). There is increasing South-
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to-South movements, and this phenomenon may be connected to HDI levels of states (Goldin,
Cameron, and Meer 2011). Also, tying into this connection is the individual agency of migrants.
While migrants are to some to degree forced to move, many migrants now are more involved in
their choice of where to go (Sanderson 2010). This agency can be characterized in connection
with more South-to-South migrations due to the increasing ability of migrants to return and leave
easier (Sanderson 2010). This ability is connected to the technological developments mentioned
earlier; in the case of sharing information migrants are able to amplify their agency in
performing a more informed choice as well as increasing their agency on the ground when
reaching their new state (Sanderson 2010). With increased agency by migrants, and even on
behalf of migrants in some cases, South-to-South migrations are becoming more normal.
In fact, this phenomenon is quickly rising with “one-half of all migrants from developing
countries now [moving] to another developing country” (Sanderson 2010: 59; Castles 2009). The
growing argument is that globalization is making this become the new trend due to increasing
HDI levels for a majority of states- especially in the case of LDCs, and developed countries may
no longer be the primary receivers (Sanderson 2010; Gorter, Nijkamp, and Poot 1998). Many of
the past Southern departure states, individually and as a region, suffered under the Cold War due
to proxy wars, intolerant and dangerous dictatorships, and being economically behind (Lozano
Ascencio and Gandini 2011). The Northern states were destinations that escaped these dangerous
situations and failing infrastructure then, but now, since many of these states and regions have
settled politically and socially with increased economic growth, they are more attractive for
regional movements (Lutz 1996).
Another aspect to consider in these movements to higher HDI level states is the fact that
the states that typically have some of the above-mentioned drivers of migration, like intrastate
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conflict and declining state infrastructures, are states with low HDI scores (Lozano Ascencio and
Gandini 2011). The movement itself does not automatically mean the highest HDI states will be
the only receiving states; it means that states with relatively higher scores than the ones migrants
are leaving will be the target destinations of migrants, hence the reason why current stability in
past unstable regions is causing more regional movement (Gorter, Nijkamp, and Poot 2009).
Latin America is an example of this due to the rising rate of development in the region by some
states and their linked rising HDI scores; this practice will only progress (Lozano Ascencio and
Gandini 2011). The movements become more regional, contributing the more South-to-South
migration, and will further the argument that developed states or states with strong economies
may not be the only places to really consider as destinations, especially when other factors
besides economic strength are considered (Lozano Ascencio and Gandini 2011).
The same trend of migration being based on states’ relative development can be found in
educational attainment, another factor of HDI and driver behind migration (United Nations
Development Programme 2009). Furthering this point is “people who move to emerging and
developing countries, as well as those who move within, tend to gain” and that this is
contributing to the rising situation of “brain circulation” as well as “brain gain” with HDI and
economic development levels on the rise (United Nations Development Programme 2009: 49;
Castles, 2009). For “brain gain,” migrants seek out opportunities educationally in higherdeveloped education institutions that generally are in states with higher HDI scores and return
back to their home country after their education attainment (Ichou 2014). Essentially, destination
possibilities, the number of people moving, and the amount of times people move, are all
increasing because they are gaining more than just economic benefits like educational attainment
(Sanderson 2010; Koser 2010). These educational movements can be connected to human
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development levels due to the deeper understanding of other factors going along with economic
development, which is typically improved because of educational attainment under “brain
circulation” and “brain gain,” and the subsequent technology and expertise moving back to
countries that need this information (Koser 2010).
In respect to this, the non-economic drivers of migration apply directly to individuals in
conflictual situations seeking refuge, increase personal security, and will provide opportunities
for the future (Gorter, Nijkamp, and Poot 1998). Because of this, states with relatively higher
levels of HDI scores will be the most attractive receiving states because of their relatively higher
security (Gorter, Nijkamp, and Poot 1998). The central inputs of the scores of HDI— education
years and healthcare with life expectancy rates— are some of the main points of focus for
migrants in these situations, especially when states in crises that have low scores of HDI struggle
with these aspects (Lozano Ascencio and Gandini 2011; United Nations Development
Programme 2009). The departure states typically are more unstable and unable to support some
of the elements going into HDI scores, which impacts their native populations’ lifestyles,
opportunities, and in extreme cases the lives of individuals themselves (Gorter, Nijkamp, and
Poot 2009). Due to this, people will migrate to survive these circumstances while seeking out
destination states with more stability and better infrastructure (Gorter, Nijkamp, and Poot 2009).
The relative size of the migrating populations will have a large impact on receiving
states’ future HDI scores due to the states’ ability to handle the wide variety migrations. The
framework of institutional aptness and the native residents’ feelings will play a large role in the
support of such migrants, and if either of these aspects are lacking it can spell dire consequences
for every level of the state and society with the expected decline of HDI scores (Gorter, Nijkamp,
and Poot 1998). These components will determine the stability of such states after these
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movements and this will either positively or negatively impact their HDI scores (Gorter,
Nijkamp, and Poot 1998). A major player in this is states’ political policies and citizens’ social
standards regarding migration and migrants (Koser 2010). In the international community, there
has been a move away from interstate to intrastate war in the shape of civil wars, rebellions, and
general unrest, which is causing different forms of migration, like refugees from persecution
(Goldin, Cameron, and Meer 2011; Lutz 1996).
States’ relationships with potential refugees and the barriers that they erect commonly
cause more illegal migration paired with humanitarian issues, which is a challenge to the state as
well as society in the sphere of being unprepared to handle migrants and the social rejection of
them with the added negative to migrants’ lives (Migration and Human Development 2009). In
conjunction, it arguably cuts down on the potential benefits states may receive from allowing
migrants to enter (Migration and Human Development 2009). This relationship is beginning to
be uncovered when comparing states who actively seek out migrants that are prepared with
governing policies, advocate for social acceptance in the domestic population, and focus on
social inclusion of migrants (Migration and Human Development 2009). Receiving states who
seek out migrants typically see a growth in their HDI as a result because they are prepared and
are harnessing the potential benefits, which creates a positive cycle (Migration and Human
Development 2009).

Global Governance and Policy Making Factors Cyclical Nature
There are myriad ways the policies and social attitudes also influence the flow of
migrants (Mouthaan 2019). According to Goldin, Cameron, and Meer, “policy shapes the context
within which potential migrants make their decisions about whether to move, where to go, and
for how long” and that “most policies are aimed at either increasing or decreasing barriers to
entry” (Goldin, Cameron, and Meer 2011: 116).The problem with this is numerous factors
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impede progression of policies, norms, and international systems (International Organization of
Migrants 2019). These blockages are multilayered with issues of sovereignty, domestic
rejections, individual states’ unclear objectives, asymmetrical process building (hegemonic
influence), and the human factor being prominent issues (International Organization of Migration
2019). A possible solution in this area is the role of information and communication (Kotyrlo
2019). Increased access to information has cheapened the cost of migration while also allowing
migrants to find better migration policies for themselves, create international contacts, and form
communities more easily in their host country (Kotyrlo 2019). Plus, “existing migration routes
and migration networks abroad facilitate the flow of refugees” (Goldin, Cameron, and Meer
2011: 115).
In response to this rapidly increasing flow and challenging situations, lagging
government policies are playing a role. Many different actors outside of individual states are
striving to fill this gap and are beginning to reshape ideas about borders and migration (Stock,
Ustubici, and Schultz 2019). The already-present migration policies are being “confronted,
succumbed, modified, and contested” by potential and current migrants, social organizations, and
civil society actors to challenge how borders and legal roadblocks are sometimes unfairly in the
way of migrants (Stock, Ustubici, and Schultz 2019: 1). This outside influence is not only on the
defensive or supportive side of migrants with many receiving states’ citizens calling for policies
restricting migration (Bohmelt, Bove, and Nussio 2020). The increasing illegal migration and the
consequences of such responses involve rising nationalism and xenophobia, degrees of
“foreignness,” acculturation, and assimilation issues for migrants (Migration and Human
Development 2009; Goldin, Cameron, and Meer 2011; O’Reilly 2012).
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A rising trend is how terrorism is impacting social attitudes and acceptance of migrants
(Bohmelt, Bove, and Nussio 2020). Even when the terrorism is not in their own state and is not
directly linked to refugees or migrants, public opinion in many receiving states will shift to
become less open and kind towards potential migrants, those already there, and the possibility of
providing aid to migrant communities (Bohmelt, Bove, and Nussio 2020). Thus, to counter
potential terrorist attacks in their state, many civil groups will begin to voice their negative
feelings towards migration and will push the government to create more restrictive policies
(Bohmelt, Bove, and Nussio 2020).
Due to the complex nature and role that states’ policies play in migration, it has been
shown that states with migration policies aimed at supporting migrant communities generally are
better prepared (Lutz 1996). The significance of this relationship is that when states are better
prepared, even in some cases states asking for migrant populations like Germany, they typically
reap more benefits from having migrants (Lutz 1996). This is not to say that the negative impacts
of migration, like social conflicts and resettlement crises, are not felt, but the state is more
prepared to control and tackle these problems, which in turn allows them to benefit the state
overall, stabilize non-migrant inhabitants, and provide direct aid to the migrant populations
(Dustmann and Glitz 2011).
From this, it has been found that states that are progressive with migration policies will
see an increase in their HDI scores, and states that lack prepared and adjusted policies will
decrease in HDI (Dustmann and Glitz 2011). The states that see a decrease in HDI scores in
relation to their migration policies often have more of the negative impacts of migration, such as
xenophobia, heightened nationalism, and even political polarity, with the potential positive
impacts from migration being repressed (Dustmann and Glitz 2011). Thus, there is a distinct
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circular relationship between governments’ policies regarding migration and the benefits
received from mobile populations. For states that had progressive policies, their HDI generally
increases, which can make them appear a better destination to future migrants, and since they
capture more benefits, these states should continue to make positive migration policies
(Dustmann and Glitz 2011). On the flip side, states with reactive policies typically see a decrease
in HDI, which may make them a less appealing destination for migrants, and as such states face
more of the problems of migration, they may be reluctant to accept future migrants (Dustmann
and Glitz 2011).
As mentioned, migration is occurring at unprecedented levels on a global scale, which
inhibits single state controls and effectiveness, causing myriad diverse consequences:
exploitation, lack of protections, inequality, disappearances, illegal movements, welfare, etc.
(Koser 2010). As a result of these consequences, many migration policies are becoming
humanitarian concerns and capturing public concern more (Lutz 1996; Koser 2010). Another
reaction has been an increased call for international cooperation, and many institutions have been
stepping in to help resolve this international problem through either acting themselves- like
Amnesty International- or creating a forum of discussion and trying to formulate international
agreements (Koser 2010; United Nations Developmental Programme 2009). The European
Union is such an organization seeking to step in and relieve some of the pressure on individual
states, especially because of the porous nature of EU borders (Zanker 2019).
In an attempt to help manage rather than control migration from Africa flowing into
Europe, the EU is beginning to work more closely with some African states, like Ghana and
Senegal, as well as organizations, like the African Union, covering migration to adopt better
policies (Zanker 2019). Many committees in the United Nations are concerned with “liberalizing
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and simplifying regular channels, ensuring basic rights for migrants, reducing transaction costs
associated with movement, improving outcomes for migrants and destination communities,
enabling benefits from mobility, [and] developing national strategies” (United Nations
Developmental Programme 2009: 95). Overall, there is a direct connection between
governmental preparedness, social acceptance, and general migration understanding, and as such
the more that governments and societies understand about migration, the better implementation
of policies and positive benefits are created (Lutz 1996).
Controlling for other possible explanations, the positive relationship between net
migration rates and HDI scores will showcase the impact HDI levels have on migratory patterns
and states’ characterization of being a destination or departure state. In connection to this theory,
the changes in migration destinations of more South-to-South movements while in the
framework of the modernizing world, it would be beneficial to study how shifting HDI levels of
states may dictate migratory choices.
Methodology
Since the aim of this paper is to research how HDI scores influence net migration rates, it
employs HDI scores from 2014 and net migration rates from 2014 and 2015 to track the
potentially positive relationship. Both variables are at a state level and on a ratio scale with net
migration detailing a country’s overall migration population per 1,000 and HDI scores indicating
a country’s level of development on a scale of zero to one. Despite the state level data, both
variables also interact at the individual level by showcasing individual’s movements and the type
of livelihood individuals can expect due to HDI scores. The reasoning behind utilizing HDI
scores in an attempt to answer migration questions and its connection to development is that HDI
gives a fuller view on state development beyond economic rates, like gross domestic product
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(GDP), which commonly has been the main marker behind development. It produces a larger
view on what development truly is, and it looks at other appeals of states beyond just economic
strength. The HDI values range from low, medium, high, and very high levels, which are
differentiated as the following: low 0-0.499, medium 0.500-0.799, high 0.800-0.899, and very
high 0.900-1 (United Nations Development Programme 2009). No state scores zero, and likewise
they do not obtain perfect scores of one either. Below are the descriptive statistics for HDI scores
in 2014.

Minimum
Maximum
Mean
Range

Figure 1: HDI Scores 2014
Number of cases
0.34
185
0.94
0.6845
0.61

For net migration, the rates allow both aspects of human migration—emigration and
immigration— to be incorporated and see that some states have a lot of movement in spite of low
levels of immigrants or emigrants. This number is derived from the totals of immigrants
subtracting the total of emigrants into a given state per 1,000. It essentially measures population
change and shifting demographics in states. It showcases flow trends for states, regions, and the
world. When combining these two elements it allows the research to examine what aspects are
most enticing for migrants and how states’ relative HDI scores may encourage movements when
looking at other states in the region. Net migration rates can be very reactive and change quickly.
Thus, year-to-year comparisons of net migration rates can be very different. The table below
includes the general descriptive statistics for the years 2014 and 2015—the two years that this
paper is utilizing.
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Figure 2: Net Migration per 1,000

Minimum
Maximum
Mean
Range

-15.7
59.2
0.3623
74.9

2014
Number of Cases
183

-54.7
54.7
0.1266
109.4

2015
Number of cases
184

The two variables that this research paper is using are the Human Development Index
(HDI2014) values by state as the independent variable and the net migration
(UNDP_Migration2014) rate by state as the dependent variable, with both being from 2014 for
the primary analysis. Both the independent and dependent variables’ data come from the
Democracy Cross-National Data set. Democracy Cross-National Data is extremely extensive due
to its state-by-state information with many of the sources being from reliable organizations. The
HDI variable comes from an extensive mathematical and logistical program run through the
United Nations. The net migration variable comes from the United Nations as well, specifically
the United Nations Development Program for Human Development Indicators.
The reliability of the data organized from such an organization is high because nearly
every state in the world participates, barring North Korea. Plus, the findings for each state are
published publicly, which means the data is easy to study, there are a multitude of related
research articles and books on the topic, and anyone can replicate this study. There are many
cases to choose from, which will aid in determining the relationship between the variables and if
outside conditions are affecting certain results or states. This means that there are more cases and
opportunities to determine if the variables have a similar relationship all around the world, not
just regional phenomena.
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In conjunction with the reliability of the data, the validity of the variables is consistent.
The HDI data may be considered more valid due to the factors that go into determining the
numerical ranking, but the net migration variable is also strong. The main point of contention
behind the net migration variable is that migration is very difficult to trace for any state and some
states may not have the operational capacity or resources to accurately track migration,
especially in the case of illegal migration. Also, both variables collect data from state reports,
which may cause issues of state transparency and doctored findings due to what states report.
Despite this, the variables are strong due to the United Nations being the institution behind the
data collection, and analysis and determining the actual values without state reports or input
would essentially be impossible.
The research will examine how the rising HDI value, a ratio scale from zero to one,
impacts the increase or decrease of net migration, another ratio scale. Other variables include net
migration rates from 2015 and a breakdown of HDI scores from 2014 with GNI per capita,
literacy rates for those 15 and older (UNDP_literacy15), and life expectancies
(UNDP_Life2014). The last two variables are from the Democracy Cross-National Data set and
the others are from the United Nations Human Development Programme: Human Development
Reports. For net migration rates from 2015, it too is measured per 1,000 in states’ populations
and its descriptive values are mentioned above in figure 2. As for GNI per capita, this value is
derived from a state’s final income for the year divided by its population. Similar to net
migration, there is a span of values that states can have with this variable. This can be seen in the
table below, which highlights the general values of the GNI per capita from 2014, the year this
paper is employing.
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Minimum
Maximum
Mean
Range

Figure 3: GNI per Capita 2014
Number of Cases
730
180
123250
18326.6
122520

The other HDI breakdown variables are also important to shed light upon. In the case of
literacy rates, the values for this variable are generated by state-reported information on literacy
rates for their population above the age of 15. This is computed by taking the number of literate
individuals divided by the total number of people in that age demographic. The values of literacy
rate at its lowest can be zero, while at its highest 100. Literacy rates generally are seen as a way
to measure the efficacy of a state’s education system.

Minimum
Maximum
Mean
Range

Figure 4: Literacy Rate 2014
Number of Cases
25.3
145
100
81.7855
74.7

Another state reported number is life expectancy. This value is determined by an
aggregate population total of ages of those at the time of death, and this number is projected onto
those at birth for their “expected” years to live. The age in years are only predictive values. This
variable is impacted by a variety of factors, like nutrition, medical practices and availability, and
presences and prevalence deadly violence. Overall, it indicates the strength of a state’s healthcare
system.

Minimum
Maximum
Mean
Range

Figure 5: Life Expectancy 2014
Number of Cases
45.56
189
83.58
70.3434
38.02
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As for control variables, there will be three different groupings. The first is concerned
with the demographic of states with percentages of refugees in a population (UNDP_Refugees)
and the percentage of the population that is already foreign (Migration_Pop). The percentage of
refugees is calculated by dividing the number of refugees by the general populace of a state; the
percentage of foreign population is measured by dividing the number of foreigners, or those not
born in the particular state, and dividing by the state’s population. The second set of control
variables is the states’ regime type (fhcat14). This variable is measured by Freedom House, an
organization that examines states’ governmental institutions. This variable is composed of 25
indicators, like electoral process, political participation, functioning of the government, and
more, that are aggregated to create an index of the strength of a state’s democracy. It is on a scale
of -4 to 100, the -4 coming from an extra optional indicator, like ethnic cleansing. The scores
states receive are subdivided into three levels: free, partly free, and not free. Scores from 71-100
are free, scores ranging 40-70 partly free, and scores from -4 to 39 are not free.
The third control group examines inequality and perceived corruption (UNDP_Gini2014
and CPI2014). The Gini coefficient captures inequality in states by determining income
inequality for states; it measures this by comparing if income was distributed equally among
individuals versus the reality of income distribution. The gap between income equally distributed
and the how income is actually distributed is the Gini coefficient. States score on a scale of zero
to 100. Generally most states reside between 20 to 70. The scale is divided, with zero to 19 being
near perfect equality, 20-29 being relative equality, 30-39 being adequate equality, 40-50 a large
income gap, and 50 and above being severe income inequality. The last variable, corruption
perception index, determines how corrupt states are seen in their public sector and apply a score

30

from zero to 100 on that perception. The index is created by a panel of experts that examine a
multitude of issues, like freedom of expression, openness to civil society, uncontrolled media,
and more, to determine the corruptness of states. States are given a score from zero, being very
corrupt, to 100, being very clean or lacking corruption. All the control variables come from the
Democracy Cross-National Data set and are measured on a ratio scale.
The primary analysis will run a regression analysis examining the relationship between
net migration and HDI scores from the year 2014. Following this analysis, a lag model will be
run with HDI scores from 2014 and net migration rates from 2015. After exploring HDI scores
as a whole, another set of regression models will be run that breaks down the components of HDI
scores. The first model will utilize net migration rates and GNI per capita, literacy rates, and life
expectancy – all from 2014, and the second model will be a lag analysis with the net migration
data from 2015 and GNI per capita, literacy rates, and life expectancy still being from 2014.
After these initial analyses, the controls will be implemented.
There will be four analyses run with the controls. The first model will be in a regression
model with net migration and HDI scores from 2014. The second model will be the controls in
the lag framework with HDI scores from 2014 and net migration rates from 2015. The third
model will place the controls with the broken-down variables of HDI scores and net migration
from 2014. The last model will be a lag model with the broken-down variables from 2014 and
net migration from 2015. In analyzing the output from these tables, special attention will be paid
to the adjusted R-squared values; this is due to the desire to uncover the correlation between the
dependent and independent variables, and discovering what that relationship looks like. Also, the
ability of adjusted R-squared in exposing predictability will help determine the importance of the
relationship between the variables.
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This paper is attempting to determine the relationship between HDI and migration rates,
whether it be an inverse or positive correlation relationship. These variables were chosen due to
their strong connection regarding influence and already extensive knowledge of both. Due to the
connected nature of the variables, it may be hard to distinguish the exact nature of the
relationship and whether or not migration also affects HDI levels. In concurrence with this, there
are many other conditions that may impact migration as well, some of which are controlled for
with the added control variables. Despite this, there are numerous factors, like foreign aid, states’
diplomatic relations, and states’ proximity, which may hold a significant impact on international
migration rates and patterns. This is commonly the case with international studies and cases, and
as such should be taken into account for any findings.
Analysis
After examining the role HDI scores and HDI scores’ breakdown variables on net
migration in both 2014 and 2015, the proposed relationship between HDI scores and net
migration rates can be determined. The first table is this research paper’s analysis baseline
findings with running a linear regression between net migration rates from 2014 and 2015 and
HDI scores from 2014.
Relationship of Migration Rates with HDI Scores: 2014 and 2015

Table 1: Net Migration and HDI Scores

Constant
HDI Scores 2014
Adjusted R-Squared
N= 180

2014
Coefficients
-8.041
12.235
0.063

2015
P-Value
0.001
0.000

Coefficients
-0.690
1.261
-0.005
N= 174

P-Value
0.842
0.798

* When HDI and its component variables are included in the same model, VIFs exceed 10,
which means multicollinearity exists and they cannot be included in the same regression model.
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HDI scores are significant, which demonstrates support for the alternative hypothesis that
HDI will impact migration rates. This significance is represented by the p-value, which is 0.000
for 2014 HDI. This value is under the .05 threshold so it supports the acceptance of the
alternative hypothesis. The data also supports the idea that the relationship would be positive, as
can be by the figure 12.235 per 1,000 in a population. This means that for every one point
increase in HDI scores, the net migration of states that see this increase can also expect 12.235
more migrants, whether it be from increasing immigrants or more retention of potential
emigrants. When applied, this effect ranges depending on states’ HDI scores. For instance, the
country with the lowest HDI score in 2014, Niger with .34, would expect approximately a
population change of 4.16 population change per 1,000. On the opposite end, the state with the
highest HDI score, Norway with .94, would expect 11.5 population change per 1,000. These
numbers showcase the range of the effect on net migration in relation to states’ HDI scores. The
strength of these numbers though, and their ability to fully explain migration rates, is not very
high.
This can be seen when examining the adjusted R-square value, which provides insight
into the predictability of the figures. This analysis provides only 6.3% of an explanation of the
variation in migration by supposing that HDI scores are the main cause. Due to this extremely
low predictability value of only 6.3%, it is necessary to examine how HDI compares to other
potential factors that may impact net migration, as is shone in the lag model with a one-year
linear regression gap between HDI scores of 2014 and net migration rates of the following year.
The relationship between HDI scores and their impact on net migration rates a year later is not
significant and counterintuitive in explaining the relationship between the two variables. First,
the impact of HDI scores on rates of migration has decreased sharply to only 1.261 more
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migrants as HDI scores increase one point rather than the 12.235 increase of migrants when the
variables are from the same year. This number 1.261 is even less important because it is not even
statistically significant with a p-value of .789, which is much higher than the .05 threshold of
significance. Another factor that displays the lack of relationship is the -.005 adjust R-squared
value. The negative nature of this number expresses that there is not a relationship between the
two variables and to assume a relationship between them is incorrect. The variability of the
change in migration rates between 2014 and 2015 cannot be explained at all by using HDI scores
from 2014.
Since table 1 does showcase a significant relationship between HDI scores and net
migration with some predictability, yet it also conveys in the 2015 column opposite findings,
when examining HDI scores and migration rates between years, a breakdown in the values of
HDI may indicate what is really impacting net migration rates. This first step towards
determining the important values and roles of certain variables in HDI scores can be found in the
next table, which analyzes GNI per capita, literacy rates of those 15 years and older, and life
expectancies in states in both 2014 and 2015.
Migration Rates Relationship with HDI Scores Breakdown: 2014 and 2015

Table 2: Net Migration and HDI Breakdown
2014
Constant
GNI Per Capita 2014
Literacy Rate 2014
Life Expectancy 2014
Adjusted R-Squares
N= 134

Coefficients
-8.620
-0.0001579
-0.014
0.135
0.001

2015
P-Value
0.084
0.600
0.742
0.157

Coefficients
-4.800
0.000248
-0.066
0.093
0.293
N= 131

P-Value
0.394
0.000
0.160
0.388

When breaking down the HDI variable into its three main components, there is a clear
distinction between which elements are affecting net migration and which are not. In the case of
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the above table, it is shown that all the breakdown variables are not only insignificant, but also
have an incredibly small impact. Starting with GNI per capita, it is insignificant with a p-value of
.600. The next two variables are just as insignificant with literacy rates being .742 and life
expectancy being .157. With all of the variables being insignificant, it is not surprising that the
adjusted R-squared value is .001, which means it predicts one percent of the variability of the
effect of these variables on net migration. This extremely low number dictates that these
elements broken down lack an important relationship with net migration.
Interestingly, the fact that these variables hold no influence over migration rates further
supports the connection between net migration and HDI scores in itself. It supports the idea that
HDI scores as indices are distinctly different from the components that are the makeup of it, thus
explaining why there is a difference in the significance and relationship when going from HDI
scores versus the breakdown variables of HDI scores. In comparison to table 1, HDI scores as
indices at least were statistically significant and did provide minimally more insight to the
relationship between HDI scores and net migration with an adjusted R-squared percentage that is
6.2% higher. Despite this, there is still a large gap in understanding this relationship, which table
2 tackles with a lag linear regression model.
In analyzing the role that the one-year lag plays on the relationship between the
breakdown variables and net migration, the first notable thing is that one variable, GNI per
capita, is statistically significant with a p-value of .000. Making this finding even more important
is that the other variables are not statistically important with literacy rates having a p-value of
.160 and life expectancy having a p-value of .388. As for the impact of GNI per capita, it is also
interesting that there is such a small connection between increasing or decreasing net migration
because the coefficient is .000248. In the case of states with low GNI per capita, like Democratic
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Republic of the Congo with a GNI per capita of 440 USD, they can expect .10912 migrants per
1,000. Conversely, in states with high GNI, like Qatar with a GNI per capita of 123,250, they can
expect approximately 31 migrants per 1,000. This slight increase in GNI per capita conveys its
smaller effect on migration rates, but this may tie into the differential nature of the net migration
variable. It also should be remembered that this small effect is applied by per 1,000 in the
population, so depending on the population size of the state this effect can become quite large.
Since net migration is determined by subtracting emigrants from immigrants and the coefficient
is .000248, this may denote a high degree of mobility of those who are choosing to migrate. It
also may be tied into more regional movements because of the relativity of HDI scores, along
with their makeup components, and the nature of regional movements, which tend to be highly
mobile with people moving back and forth quickly and seeking better opportunities in a close
place.
Another notable factor for this linear regression model is that the adjusted R-square is
.293, which is much higher and illuminating on the relationship between the variables than the
previous adjusted R-squared values. The value in this case denotes that the variables in this
model are able to explain 29.3%, and while this number is still low, it is a markedly larger
insight to the connection between these variables and their relation to net migration in a one-year
lag framework. It highlights the fact that while the HDI score factors are unimportant during the
same year, their impact does shift over time and their relation with the dependent variable of net
migration. Despite this impact, there are numerous issues that need to be controlled for, which
the next table will introduce.
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Migration Rates Relation with HDI Scores in a Control Framework: 2014 and 2015

Table 3: Net Migration and HDI Scores with Controls

Constant
HDI Scores
Refugees 2014 (thousands)
Foreign Population 2005
Regime Type 2014
Gini Coefficient 2014
Corruption Perception Index 2014
Adjusted R-Squared
N= 91

2014
Coefficients
-6.666
0.789
-0.017
0.113
1.463
-0.006
0.080
0.563

P-Value
0.002
0.689
0.000
0.001
0.000
0.815
0.000

2015
Coefficients
-20.325
0.248
-0.005
-0.036
4.947
0.127
0.172
0.061
N= 87

The relationship between net migration and HDI scores when controlling for other
possible factors changes greatly from the relationship when controls are not included. The HDI
score variable goes from being statistically significant to insignificant, at a p-value of .689, and
other variables impact net migration more. Of all the control variables, refugee population per
country of origin, foreign population per state populace, regime type, and the corruption
perception index are relevant in affecting net migration values. With p-values of .000, .001, .000,
and .000 respectively, each of these variables impact migration in different ways. Of the four
significant values, foreign population, regime type, and corruption perception index cause more
migrants as their values increase with values of .113, 1.463, and .080. This means that a state
with higher foreign populations, the more “free” a regime is politically and civilly, and a state
with a higher score on the corruption index, denoting a “cleaner state,” will be more attractive as
a destination country, which is relevant for migrants who have more agency to choose their
destination and helps migrants who lack the freedom to choose to settle in better.
Conversely, especially since the foreign population variable is positive, the more refugees
a state receives the less attractive the state becomes as a destination with a value of -.017.
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P-Value
0.018
0.976
0.674
0.789
0.003
0.217
0.035

Another interesting value in this table is the adjusted R-square, which is .563. This value is
substantially higher than all the adjusted R-squared values from the tables above and since it
amounts to a predictability of 56.3% in covering how these variables impact migration rates, it is
a strong indicator of the relationship between the significant variables and net migration with the
ability to predict future or other movements by using those variables.
In connection to this relationship, the lag model data of 2015 on the migration rate is
noteworthy to see if these shift in significance – a trend seen in table 1 with the year lag.
Table 3 showcases that HDI scores are still insignificant, a carryover from table 1 and its lag
model, even when there are controls added. HDI scores have a p-value of .976, much higher than
the .05 threshold, thus making it unimportant when it comes to influencing migration rates.
Different in 2015 than in 2014 is the fact that only two of the controls are statistically significant
– regime type with a p-value of .003 and the corruption perception index with a p-value of .035.
The relationship with migration stays positive and even increases for both in connection to
migration with a value of 4.947 for regime type and .172 for corruption perception index.
Overall, this linear regression analysis, despite the impact of regime type and the corruption
perception index, is not a good indicator of what influences migration as can be seen with the
6.1% value of the adjusted R-squared. This low value and the lack of HDI scores’ influence is
further explored in the next table, which runs a linear regression analysis with the HDI scores’
breakdown variables and the controls.
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Migration in Relation to HDI Breakdown Variables with Controls: 2014 and 2015

Table 4: Net Migration and HDI Breakdown with Controls
2014
Constant
GNI Per Capita 2014
Literacy Rate 2014
Life Expectancy 2014
Refugees 2014 (thousands)
Foreign Population 2005
Regime Type 2014
Gini Coefficient 2014
Corruption Perception Index 2014
Adjusted R-Squared
N= 70

Coefficients
-5.63
-0.000002308
0.007
-0.007
-0.016
0.179
1.093
0.020
0.047
0.562

P-Value
0.039
0.826
0.670
0.860
0.000
0.000
0.008
0.434
0.063

2015
Coefficients
-30.007
0.000227
-0.088
0.213
-0.005
0.007
4.181
0.116
0.185
0.419
N= 68

This table somewhat continues the statistical significance pattern seen in table 3 in 2014
with the variables of refugee population per country of origin, foreign population percentage, and
regime type all being significant. The corruption perception index is no longer statistically
significant when the regression is run with HDI component variables and net migration in 2014.
With p-values of .000, .000, and .008, they are the only values on this table that are statistically
important, which also follows along with the trends from table 1, which showed how the HDI
breakdown variables were all insignificant as well. Also carrying over from table 1 is that the
nature of each variables’ relationship does not change. The coefficient for refugees is still
negative, while the foreign population and regime type are still positive. Interestingly, the 2014
data does diverge with table 1 in that the adjusted R-squared value is much higher, and thus,
making the statistical relationships in this table much stronger. The .562 value of the adjusted Rsquared, or 56.2%, highlights the close relationship between the significant values and migration
rates.
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P-Value
0.004
0.000
0.177
0.164
0.553
0.960
0.007
0.219
0.053

Another noteworthy characteristic of this value is that it acts conversely from table 2. The
extremely low adjusted R-squared value in that table for the year 2014, .001, is completely
flipped when running the same HDI breakdown variables with the same year net migration rates
with controls for a value of .562. This huge increase without a change in significance for the HDI
breakdown variables showcases just how much the control variables are explaining the rates and
possibly patterns of net migration, thus making HDI scores seem further removed. This is not
completely the case, though; HDI scores and their influence can be seen in the lag year model
when net migration is from 2015.
Migration in the above regression output is chiefly influenced by the GNI Per Capita
variable, as can be seen in the .000 p-value, and by the fact that only one of the other control
variables have statistical significance, regime type with a p-value of .007, which has consistently
been significant. This draws light to the fact that none of the last few variables – refugee
population, foreign population, and the corruption perception index – were significant. This is an
important shift because of all the data from the tables with the control variables accounted for,
this is the only one where at least one of these independent variables is significant while only one
control variable is significant. Paired with this, the fact that only GNI per capita is significant out
of all the component variables of HDI scores highlights its more direct role and relationship with
net migration. The other breakdown variables of HDI scores, literacy and life expectancy, are
still not statistically significant, which follows the trend from table 2. It also provides further
support of the relationship of the importance of GNI per capita when applying a year lag, as can
be seen in the differing statistical importance in table 2 for both 2014 and 2015.
Along with this, the prominence of the connection between GNI per capita and net
migration is amplified by the adjusted R-squared value of .419, or 41.9%. This value is larger

40

than that in table 2 for 2015, and emphasizes the significance of GNI per capita, especially when
all other variables are insignificant except regime type. The fact that the coefficient is still
.000227 echoes the idea that migration movements are extremely mobile between states and the
possible factor that movements are being done regionally. Also, keeping in mind that this effect
is applied per 1,000 in a state’s population is key due to the relevance of population rates. Putting
this into perspective with the two GNI per capita cases above, when GNI per capita’s effect is
applied to the Democratic Republic of the Congo’s GNI per capita of 440, the effect is .09988
per 1,000 in the population. As for Qatar and its GNI per capita of 123,250, the effect is 27.977
per 1,000.

Final Analysis
The definitive relationship between net migration and HDI scores is anything but a
definitive relationship, as can be seen in the fluctuating relevance and significance in the tables
above. When trying to determine if HDI scores do have a positive relationship with net
migration, only table 1 supports the idea that a higher HDI score will increase a state’s net
migration rate. Despite this support, since the adjusted R-squared value is so low, this support
can be seen as very fickle, something that table 1 in 2015 and table 3 for both 2014 and 2015
showcase, since HDI scores are no longer statistically significant. In short terms, HDI scores as
indices are only positively correlated with net migration when examining data from the same
year and there are no other possible influences provided as alternative impactors on net
migration.
When HDI scores are broken down into its components, GNI per capita, literacy rates,
and life expectancy, there is a slightly better correlation between HDI scores and migration rates.
In tables two and four, GNI per capita is statistically significant. Problematically for HDI scores,
neither of the other two breakdown variables of literacy rates and life experiences are significant.
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This makes it seem that net migration is correlated with GNI per capita and not HDI scores since
not all of the variables were significant. Also, GNI per capita was only statistically significant
when placed in the lag model with its values being from 2014 and those of net migration from
2015. This difference further removes it from the same scope of HDI scores because HDI scores
were only relevant when the data of its scores were from the same year as the net migration.
Another diverging factor is that in the tables where GNI per capita was significant, no
other variable or control was significant except for regime type, thus GNI per capita was the only
variable impacting net migration in these regressions with only one control variable also having
an effect on net migration. This further supports the idea that GNI per capita has its own impact
on net migration without a reliance on HDI scores to prop its relationship. Along these lines, the
adjusted R-squares in the tables in which only GNI per capita was significant out of the HDI
score components were much higher values than the adjusted R-squared value in the table in
which HDI scores was significant, which denotes a stronger connection between the GNI per
capita and net migration. Knowing this, it calls into question when HDI scores were statistically
significant if this was propped up by the close relation between net migration and GNI per
capita. This issue of propping by GNI per capita for HDI scores can be written off slightly
considering that HDI scores were only significant when HDI scores and net migration rates were
from the same year, while GNI per capita was only significant when GNI per capita and net
migration rates were from two different years.
One thing that HDI scores do have a higher value on is its effect on the rates of migrants
as can be seen when comparing HDI scores’ coefficients with those of GNI per capita. When
significant, HDI scores increase net migration 12.235 per increase of one point in HDI scores.
Conversely, every time that GNI per capita is significant, it increases net migration by .000248
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and .000227 per one dollar increase in GNI per capita; it should be remembered this effect on net
migration is per 1,000. This may be due to the increasing mobility of migrant populations,
especially in the case of regional movements which typically support season or cyclical
movements. Regional movements are supporting the rising trend of more South-to South
migration rather than South-to-North migration. The role of GNI per capita, which has been
slowly rising in many developing or lesser-developed countries, paired with the increasing
regional migration supports this trend. This may be tied into relative regional HDI scores as well
since GNI per capita is a variable used in the HDI indices. While the other aspects of HDI scores
were not relevant in the tables above and GNI per capita was, it does not mean that net migration
is impacted by GNI per capita and not HDI scores, especially when HDI scores from the same
year as net migration are significant and GNI per capita from the same year as net migration is
not.
Conclusion
Overall, the findings in this paper provide further illumination on the human phenomenon
that is migration. While HDI scores of states do play only a minor and sometimes insignificant
role, knowing this information is important for states to understand, especially when considering
how their own development may make them appear as a destination or departure state. Besides
the role of HDI scores, the secondary findings of the importance of refugees in populations,
percentage of foreign populations in states, regime type (free, fairly free, and not free), and the
corruption perception index all shed light upon what other factors are potentially taken into
account for migrants. Along this line, the breakdown of HDI scores into its respective divisions
of economic security, education, and health help determine which factor is significant and when
this applies.
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The role time plays on migration can be briefly seen when the independent variables,
from HDI scores to its breakdown variables, were significant. Since HDI scores were only
significant when in the same year as migration, this may provide an idea of the connection and
importance of HDI scores being an indicator of general expected wellbeing of those living in
those states. This would come into play in the case of forced migrations, especially those that are
very rapid with migrants being driven by crises in personal survival. Tied into this type of forced
migration is the rising role of regional movements. In these cases, migrants are not looking
necessarily for destination states to settle in for long term reasons, but as short-term solutions. In
connection with this, some cases of forced migration impact large segments of societies, like
environmental disasters, and relating to populations of lower socioeconomic status, their ability
to migrate to far destinations or states with marginally higher HDI scores can be limited due to
monetary issues. This can be connected to the rising trend of South-to-South movements, which
are diverging from past historical trends of South-to-North directional migration movements.
As for the breakdown variables, the only time any of these variables was significant was
in the models with a one-year lag. Along with this, only GNI per capita was statistically
significant, which may point to the role economic security and opportunity plays on decisions for
migrants, especially decisions in cases of non-forced migration. While this research paper did not
examine the role of economic development or security outright, it would be advantageous to
analyze if economic factors are more influential in migrations that are more planned or thought
out rather than forced. Another interesting insight that the breakdown variables provide is that
when GNI per capita was significant, no other factor other than regime type was statistically
significant. This illuminates the direct connection between GNI per capita and net migration, and
does provide the idea that maybe GNI per capita is a significant driving force behind migration.
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Expanding upon this, in relation to the impact on net migration, GNI per capita did not
increase or decrease migratory rates drastically – only by .000248 and .000227. This may
possibly be linked to increasing mobility of migrants themselves, as can be seen in seasonal
migrations, lowering barriers to migration with more favorable government policies, improved
travel methods, wider information networks, and the increasing number of drivers. Just because
education and health indicators in the HDI breakdown variables did not register as significant in
this research does not mean that they are insignificant or are not drivers of migration. There are
numerous reasons why people choose to migrate, many of which we have not uncovered the
significance of or when such drivers are relevant, which reflects upon the nebulous and
complicated nature that is the human phenomenon of migration.
In spite of the global scale presented and the extensive cross-national comparisons
afforded in this paper, there are limitations to the data and also the foundations to explaining
migration itself. In regards to the data, some states are not featured due to the lack of data present
on them and the data itself is commonly state reported. This raises the question on the legitimacy
of the data, especially in cases where states would like to present a more positive front so their
reporting numbers may be favorably skewed. Despite this, the majority of the data is from the
United Nations in some scope, which brings back some legitimacy due to the strength of the UN
institution.
Another possible limitation in the data is the tracking of net migration, which is typically
more difficult than what is assumed on paper. For instance, illegal migration poses a challenge of
determining actual numbers for even large, organized countries. This effect is only heightened in
smaller, less-organized states who may lack the resources to accurately track such an issue.
Beyond the data, trying to utilize HDI as the main explanation behind net migration increases or
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decreases is arguably presumptuous. In cases of forced migration, whether it be natural disasters,
civil wars, or political and social persecutions, HDI would probably not play as huge a role in an
individual's choice to leave than in cases of more regular migration. HDI scores may possibly
help determine the destination countries.
Since comparing HDI values and net migration rates hopefully provide researchers with
at least a baseline of understanding in the most basic sense, further research may be conducted in
regards to the individual with more observable experiences and testimonies. By understanding
the individuals’ reasoning behind movements, researchers may be able to glean information not
previously taken into account or the significance of different factors, especially in cases of forced
migrations. It could also potentially be done regionally to determine if certain cultural, social,
and political elements play a larger role in the individual’s thought process in some parts of the
world versus others.
In addition to this, it would be of interest to see how an individual's knowledge of states’
regulations of migration impact their choices, and ascertain if the individual is accurately
informed of states’ laws. Also relative to the migrant, breaking down net migration by age
groups would be a good next step in trying to understand how HDI scores and its components
effect migration decisions. This may expose if age plays a role in what migration factors are
most attractive to certain age groups. Along the informed vein, examining states’ changing
policies in respect to migration – strategies aimed at attracting certain qualities in migrants, legal
guidelines of migration and the ease or difficulty of said rules, and states’ policies in regards to
populace push back or acceptance – would all be interesting avenues of research that would
further illuminate the role of states in modern migration patterns. Since migration is such a
global phenomenon, yet is uniquely a human experience, seeing how international barriers
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interact with immigration and emigration would be key to study in hopes to clarify and better
manage such a difficult issue that will only continue to grow in numbers and globally.
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